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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) has come in for a lot of inflammatory
rhetoric  in  recent years, primarily  at the hands of property rights groups,
land-intensive  businesses,  chemical  manufacturers  and  users,  and  their
associations. The  Act is up for reauthorization.  (Actually, it expired three
years  ago, but most  statutes,  ESA  among them,  remain  in  effect  unless
repealed.)  Reauthorization  provides  an  avenue  for  change,  focusing the
attention of special-interest  groups and making the Act a more attractive
target.  Prominent  among the charges  levelled  by its  detractors  are:  ESA
protects  listed  species  to  the  exclusion  of human  needs;  ESA  ignores
economic considerations,  imposing burdensome, inequitable costs on land-
owners,  businesses  and  workers;  ESA  constitutes  an  unconstitutional
"taking"  of private  property without compensation.  In this paper, I distin-
guish legitimate concerns about the Act and the endangered species process
from self-serving carping, summarize the Administration's and Congress'
proposals for reforming the process and the Act; and report on the status of
and prospects for reauthorization.  I begin by reviewing  the basic structure
of the  Act,  and  the  stages  at  which  economic  considerations  enter  the
process.
The Endangered Species  Process
For our purposes, the endangered species  process  is composed of three
elements:  listing (§4); the subsequent protections, prohibited activities and
enforcement (§7 and 9); and relief/exemption  from the sanctions of the Act
(§7 and 10). Consistent with the central purpose of the Act (the conservation
of endangered,  threatened  species  and their ecosystems),  listing  is done
solely on the basis of biological considerations. Along with listing a species,
the Act requires the Secretary to designate critical habitat. Although listing
is  based  on  biology,  in  configuring  critical  habitat,  the  Secretary  must
consider economic  impacts, and may exclude potential sites if their oppor-
tunity costs are too high. The final configuration must satisfy the biological
imperative,  however.
Regulatory Constraints-Once listed,  §9  protects  a  species  against
"taking"-broadly, harming in some way, including degrading  its habitat.
The  take  prohibition  applies  to  all  entities,  private  and  public.  Plants,
however, are not protected on private  land. In addition, §7 prohibits federal
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habitat.  Sometimes,  §7  can  affect  private entities, because  some  private
activities require a federal permit or other federal action. These prohibitions
are not tempered by economic considerations, and it  is this feature  which
makes the Act such a tempting target for vilification.
Regulatory Relief-The  situation  is  not  quite  so  rigidly  inflexible,
however. As indicated above, §7 and  10 provide opportunities to reduce the
regulatory burden;  §  10 allows the Secretary to grant permits to take listed
species. Taking must be incidental to engaging in otherwise legal activities,
and permits are conditioned on carrying out an approved conservation plan.
Protective measures can involve land set-asides, but many do not. Often the
restrictions are limited to management changes and prescriptions.  Restric-
tions on the use of agricultural  chemicals and insecticides  are  a principal
example.  Generally,  such  adjustments  to  management  practices  involve
minimal or modest costs.
Not only does §7 allow economics to be considered; it also provides for
complete exemption from the strictures ofthe Act, if a project is sufficiently
important. Once a federal agency determines that an action it is considering
may  affect  a  listed  species,  §7  requires  it  to  consult  with  the  Fish  and
Wildlife Service (FWS) to try to devise a way to conduct the proposed action
without jeopardizing  the  species.  In  the vast  majority of cases,  project
modifications consistent with conserving the species  are effected at mini-
mal cost. If there are no reasonable modifications, however, the agency can
appeal to a cabinet-level committee  for an exemption. Exemptions are not
granted lightly. The administrative hearing process can be both lengthy (six
months or more) and costly, and the standards for exemption are exacting;
basically, that the project is of paramount economic import. Thus, contrary
to the inflated  rhetoric, the process does take economics into account and
does embody considerable  flexibility.
Perverse Incentives  and the Nature of the Costs
Having  clarified the record,  however,  it would  be  disingenuous  not to
acknowledge the Act's effects, or to contend that it does not entail costs or
inequities, or could not benefit from reform. Nothing with the scope of the
Endangered  Species Act is devoid of costs.
Navigating the administrative process can be time consuming and create
uncertainty, both of which are  costly. The restrictions  on private land use
can reduce the income which landowners can earn from their property. All
of this  creates  anti-conservation  incentives,  with  landowners  frequently
striving to avert the discovery of  a species or its habitat on their land. Indeed,
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specific circumstances, once a species  is proposed for listing, landowners
may have an incentive to incur advocacy costs, hiring scientists, planners,
lawyers and lobbyists in an effort to prevent land-use restrictions from being
applied  to  their  property.  Because  of the  generally  inadequate  habitat
conditions  that  exist  once  a  species  reaches  the  stage  at  which  it  is  a
candidate  for listing, there  is likely to be a greater need for strict conserva-
tion  of  the  remaining  habitat.  This  may  reduce  the  opportunities  for
compatible  commercial  activities.  Often  landowners,  caught  in  such cir-
cumstances, complain that it is unfair for them to bear such costs, given that
other landowners were able to degrade or destroy habitat before the species
was  listed (Goldstein  and Heintz).
Thus, there  are  indeed  costs to  protecting  endangered  and threatened
species.  Be  mindful,  however,  that advocates  routinely  misrepresent  the
effects of the ESA in order to exaggerate the potential burdens for develop-
ment. The resurgent property rights movement in this country is particularly
prone to this offense.  What one owns when one owns land, what one does
and does not have title to, what one's property rights are, are all central to
the issue of who should bear the burden of regulatory costs, whether from
ESA or any other statute. The charge has been levelled that ESA constitutes
an  unconstitutional  "taking"  of private  property  without  compensation.
Numerous bills have been  introduced  in Congress this year to address this
issue. A brief sojourn into legal history will prove enlightening at this point.
Property Rights and Their Evolution
One does not have unfettered  use of one's property. Property  is always
purchased  subject  to  prevailing  limitations.  Property  rights  (commonly
called "the bundle of sticks"  in the legal literature) are not inalienable,  and
never have been. They did not descend from the Mount. They are a creature
of the social compact, and they evolve with the changing nature of society.
Indeed,  most  takings  challenges  are  evolutionary  exercises.  They  are
attempts  to redefine property rights rather than to preserve existing ones.
The property rights bills now before the Congress are excellent examples
of  the genre. The bills profess to be protectors of constitutionally guaranteed
rights,  but they stand  in sharp contrast to court doctrine, and are  far from
subtle in  redefining property rights. At numerous junctures they dispense
with limitations  long  in effect.
To  varying  degrees,  the  bundle  of sticks  that  constitutes  property
includes the right to: exclude others from one's property; occupy and derive
beneficial use; convey and bequeath (McElfish, p.  10240). These attributes
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centuries, and have never been absolute. The right to use and manage one's land
as one saw fit was fundamental to 18th century England and colonial America.
But, rooted in both English common law ofthe time and property law in colonial
America, was the concept of protection from externalities (a cost imposed upon
person A as a result ofB engaging in an activity beneficial to him). A landowner
had the right to the "quiet enjoyment" of  his property, by which was meant "the
power to prevent any use of his neighbor's land that conflicted with his own
private  enjoyment"  (McElfish,  p.  10237).  Inevitably,  development  and
industrial society conflicted with the absolute nature of these prior rights to
protection from harm. Legal doctrines began to emerge which deferred less
to prior rights, and gave more emphasis to the balancing of beneficial uses.
Thus,  the  laws  governing  property  have  been  abridged  and  modified
regularly to reflect the changing nature of society. Sometimes the conditions
inherent in existing contracts have been preserved, and new doctrines applied
only to future transactions; sometimes changes have been applied retroactively.
Sometimes constraints have been accompanied by compensation; sometimes
not (Goldstein and Watson).
Property Rights and the ESA
The  enactment  of ESA  in  1973  constituted  an  amendment  to  existing
property  rights.  One  could  make  a plausible  argument  that some  property
owners at that time suffered capital  losses; in almost all cases, partial  losses.
Congress could have compensated affected landowners in 1973. It chose not to.
This is standard practice; legislative compensation  provisions are extremely
rare. Most legislation affects people's income or wealth in one direction or
another-some positively, some negatively. We do not generally compen-
sate those who have their activities restricted by new laws or regulations,
nor do we tax those who experience windfall gains as a result of government
actions. To do so would make it virtually impossible to govern. In the words
of  my learned colleague, Joe Sax: "We don't pay people notto do bad things
to us."  We don't pay them not to dump toxic waste  in our waterways; we
don't pay them  to  stop manufacturing  CFC's which  punch holes  in the
ozone layer; we don't pay them because zoning prohibits them from siting
a chemical  facility in a residential area, and we don't pay them not to use
their property  for criminal  activities.  Destroying  endangered  species  or
their habitat is a bad thing, and, as a property owner, you do not have the
right to engage in it. In the legal vernacular, it is not one of the sticks in the
bundle of rights which you got when you purchased property.
What about purchasers of land since 1973, or landowners whose property
is affected when a new species is listed? Should they be compensated? I am
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conservative  economist  and  favorite  of the  right,  sneered,  "a  bunch  of
babies,"  by which I take it he meant that investors should be mindful of the
potential for government regulatory action, understand that they are taking
risks when purchasing property, and adjust their offering price accordingly.
Is any of this a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
taking private property for public use withoutjust compensation?  In a word,
no. The courts have taken a very cautious view of takings claims, requiring
a near-total loss of value before compensation is due. In so doing, they have
rejected the proposition that property owners are entitled to the maximum
potential  return on their investments.  Again, to do otherwise would make
such basic local  community protections as zoning, health and safety, and
pollution control unmanageable.
The Art of the Possible
I cannot tell you how few  converts one makes  among landowners  and
property rights ideologs with this scholarly little recitation of the evolution
and status of property rights law, and its underlying ethic.  The classically
conservative  stance notwithstanding,  politics is the art of the possible, and
sometimes  it is  not possible  to  be  philosophically  pure  when  trying  to
govern.
Administration Proposals
After a period of reflection, the Administration proposed a 1  0-point program
for improving the ESA (White House Office of Environmental Policy). Many
of  the changes are aimed at reducing the regulatory and economic burden ofthe
Act and providing landowners with certainty  about their responsibilities  and
administrative decisions.  Principal among these are:
Early identification of allowable activities. In conjunction with listing, the
Services  (FWS and NMFS) are to identify  specific activities that are exempt
from the "take" prohibitions of §9.
Expedite habitat  conservation  planning  (HCP). The Services have published
a  draft  procedure  for  streamlining  the  §10  permitting  process,  including
designating categories ofHCPs based on an activity's threat to the species (high,
medium or low). The proposal calls for simplified and expedited processing for
applications involving low or medium  impacts.
"No surprises" policy. In  the event  of unforeseen  circumstances,  no
additional  land restrictions or financial contribution will be required from
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extraordinary circumstances, the FWS could seek additional mitigation, but
it would be limited to modifications within the habitat already conserved or
to operating prescriptions for the conservation program.  The Administra-
tion has recommended that Congress enact similar certainty assurances for
landowners  who  cover  candidate  species  in  their  HCP.  The  assurances
would indemnify the landowner from additional mitigation requirements in
the event that the candidate species  is listed.
Small landowner exemption. This provision  would exempt  small land-
owners who use their property as a residence, want to disturb five acres or
less,  or  want  to  undertake  activities  that  have  a  negligible  effect  on
threatened species. The FWS has published a proposed rule. It covers new
listings of threatened species, but the FWS is considering a corresponding
exemption  for species already  listed.  The Administration has asked  Con-
gress for authority to extend the rule to endangered  species.
The Administration is also considering ways to use market mechanisms
to  achieve  gains  in  conservation  efficiency  and  equity  (The  Keystone
Center; Fischer and Hudson). Incentives may be able to help to bring about
land use patterns that achieve habitat objectives  at lower cost. Incentives
may  also  induce  innovations  in  the  production  of habitat  and  in  the
techniques  employed  in  managing  land  for commercial  uses  that  allow
habitat objectives to be met at lower cost. Land management techniques that
make habitat conservation and other uses more compatible hold particular
promise  for reducing  the  costs of meeting  conservation  goals.  It is  not
feasible,  however,  to  rely primarily  on  markets  for  the  preservation  of
ecological  resources.  Many critical  conditions  necessary  for markets  to
function  properly  cannot  be  fulfilled  for  such  resources.  To  function
properly, market mechanisms for conservation have to be used in conjunc-
tion with  diligently  enforced  regulatory  regimes (Goldstein  and  Heintz;
Goldstein). Finally, conservation incentive systems generally require fund-
ing (tax  inducements,  direct  payment  schemes),  and  although they may
achieve a given objective  more cheaply than command  and control, Con-
gress is always wary of funding a new program.
Congressional  Bills
There are numerous bills addressing the ESA in the Congress. None are
serious efforts to reform the process for protecting vulnerable species and
their ecosystems. Their intent is to reduce protections to a minimum, while
freeing up private activities. In general, they do this by: limiting the grounds
for listing; establishing numerous opportunities for procedural challenges
to listing, including judicial review; abandoning the biological  imperative
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conservation  plan for a  species;  narrowing  the definition of "take,"  and,
hence,  the regulated  offenses;  restricting  habitat  protection  primarily  to
designated federal lands (parks, wilderness areas, and special refuges), and
on private lands, requiring compensation for landowners, or relying largely
on  voluntary conservation  efforts.  The bills  are  too  numerous  for  me to
summarize  each here. I focus on the principal bill  in the House, HR 2275,
but S. 768  is similar in many respects.
Conservation  objectives and  requirements. Deletes as a goal of the ESA
the conservation of ecosystems  on which listed species depend.
Abandons the restoration of species to a recovered status as the central goal
of the ESA. Following listing, a task force would assess the conservation needs
of the species, and the social and economic effects of such conservation. Based
on the  task force's report,  the  Secretary  is  given broad  discretion  to craft a
conservation objective for the species-ranging from only prohibiting deliber-
ate killing of members of the species to complete recovery.
Requires emphasis on captive breeding as a technique for protecting and
restoring species, ignoring the National Academy of Science's conclusion
that captive  breeding  is  fraught  with  problems  and  not  a  substitute  for
habitat protection and other conventional  conservation measures.
Diminishedprotections.  Eliminates adverse modification of habitat as a
prohibition under §9, thereby reversing the recent Supreme Court decision
in  Sweet Home. Defines "harm"  only as the direct killing or injuring of a
member of a listed species.
Restricts critical habitat designations to areas occupied by a species at the
time of listing, thereby handicapping  conservation efforts to re-establish a
species and achieve recovery. Removes protection for distinct populations.
Reducedprotections  on public lands.  Amends the requirement that federal
agencies use their authorities  in furtherance of the purposes of the ESA for the
conservation  of listed  species,  to  require  such  actions  only  to  the  extent
consistent with their primary missions. Allows federal agencies to self-regulate
and determine whethertheir actions would  jeopardize a species (violate §7), and
reduces thejeopardy standard from "likelytojeopardize the continued existence
of the  species" to "significant  diminution of the likelihood of survival of the
species by significantly reducing  the...entire species."
On federal lands, species are to be conserved only in "biological diversity
reserves,"  crafted from existing parks, refuges, wilderness areas and areas
offered by non-federal parties.
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for diminutions in the value of  any portion of  his property by 20 percent or more
due to federal actions taken under the ESA. Compensation would come from
the action agency's budget, thereby discouraging enforcement.
This last deserves special attention. It is a radical provision which would
expand property  rights  and  the entitlement  to compensation  far beyond
current court standards. (This Congress  is particularly fond of this type of
legislation;  similar  provisions  having  been  introduced  in over  100  bills
since January.)  Under current court standards, if a regulation with a valid
public purpose eliminates all economic  use (including reasonable,  invest-
ment-backed  expectations)  of an  entire piece of property, a  taking  has
probably occurred. In contrast, this bill authorizes segmentation. Thus, if an
agency action diminishes the fair market value of aportion  of a property by
more than 20 percent, the property owner would be entitled to compensa-
tion. In brief, the bill would expand the judicial standard for property rights
and the entitlement to compensation  by:
* Ignoring whether the action had a valid public  purpose;
* Focusing  on the regulated portion of the property, i.e., specifically
allowing segmentation; and
* Lowering the threshold  for eligibility for compensation from essentially
100 percent (the constitutional standard) to 20 percent.
The provision is a prescription  for disaster-extensive  litigation,  frivo-
lous claims for compensation, endless bickering about changes in property
values and their causes,  inestimable budgetary drains. If enacted, this bill
will radically  alter the relationship  between  the citizenry and  its  govern-
ment, and set a precedent for legislation to come. The bill does nothing to
address the acknowledged  inequities and inefficiencies under ESA, opting
instead  for sweeping  compensation  provisions,  and crippling the  protec-
tions for endangered species and their ecosystems.
These species aren't here for nothing. Each plays  a role  in a complex,
integrated,  interdependent ecosystem.  If you think conserving the ecosys-
tem is expensive, try getting along with one that is severely degraded and
malfunctioning.
Finally, a look at the prospects for reauthorization. It does not appear that
gridlock  and confrontation  have given way to bipartisan statesmanship.
Secretary Babbitt has condemned the congressional proposals as irrespon-
sible and  unacceptable,  and has recommended  a presidential  veto  in the
absence  of significant  revisions.  S.  768  has  a  private  property  rights/
compensation provision, but it is much more vague than that in the House
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the  House,  so the  prospects  for this  particular  feature  are questionable.
Many of the other provisions  under consideration in the House and Senate
bills would have to be significantly revised before a bill would be acceptable
to the Administration.  Given the complexity of this issue and Congress'
other priorities, it seems unlikely that bills could pass both houses; that the
differences will be resolved in conference, and that a bill will be sent to the
President before the end of the year. It is more likely that the bills now before
the Congress are the opening salvos, and that the real action will occur next
year. Presidents try to avoid controversial decisions during an election year.
But  unless  a  more  responsible  reauthorization  bill  emerges  from  the
legislative process, a veto is virtually certain,  and likely can be sustained.
NOTE
The views expressed  in this paper are the author's, and do not necessarily  reflect
those of the Department of the  Interior.
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